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When we model human choices under risk, the standard is to apply a rational 
choice model such as Expected Utility Theory (EUT). However, humans are not always 
rational, and Kahneman and Tversky developed Prospect Theory (PT) to account for 
people’s cognitive limitations in decision-making. However, both EUT and PT do not 
differentiate among individuals, nor discuss factors that lead to different risk preferences 
and rationality for different individuals. This study examines whether academic 
experience in economics reduces risk aversion and irrationality. A survey was 
administered to economics and non-economics majors in Occidental College. The survey 
was design as pairs of gambling choices to detect subjects’ risk preferences and responses 
when induced to display certainty, framing, reflection and lottery effect as defined in PT. 
It was found that economics majors had lower risk aversion, and generally behaved 
differently from non-economics majors in rationality tests, although their behaviors were 
not always more consistent with EUT than those of non-economics majors. Academic 
experience in economics, in most cases, significantly reduced risk aversion and 
irrationality among non-economics students, but this learning effect was not observed 
among economics majors. A further test of self-selection among economics and non-
economics major with little economics training showed that economics majors were born 
rather than made. It is further shown that the monetary incentives used in this study 
reduced risk aversion, but did not have much impact on rationality. It is also found that 
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risk aversion and irrationality were positively correlated, and math/science majors were 
more rational than humanities majors.  
 



















Impact of Academic Experience in Economics on Risk Preferences and Rationality: 
An Empirical Investigation 
 
1. Introduction 
 Economic theories of consumer behavior strive to understand the trade-offs 
economic agents face and the motivations behind their choices. These theories have 
historically assumed that each economic agent is rational, and is, in Herbert Simon’s 
words, “a maximizer, who will settle for nothing less than the best”. Here, rationality 
means for each individual to achieve his or her own personal goals, whatever the goals 
are. Along this line, Jon von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) developed 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) to mathematically model people’s rational choices under 
risk, taking into account their risk preferences. Modern evidence has suggested, however, 
that people are not always rational, and their behaviors systematically deviate from EUT 
predictions. In response, an important behavioral model, Prospect Theory (PT), was 
invented by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979) to explain these deviations 
from EUT.  
 Both EUT and PT are overarching theories that do not acknowledge individual 
differences; people may have different risk preferences and levels of rationality. Thus, it 
is an interesting question whether academic experience in economics has any impact on 
these measures. This empirical study will compare risk preferences and rationality 
between economics majors, who have more economic training, and non-economics 
Zhou 5 
majors, who have less economic exposure. The major motivation here is to separate the 
effect of economic learning from self-selection. Specifically, the research will analyze: 
1) whether economics majors are less risk averse than non-economics majors; 
2) whether economics majors better fit in the profile of EUT, while non-economics 
majors better fit in the profile of PT; and 
3) whether disparities in behaviors between economics and non-economics majors is due 
to academic training in economics (learning hypothesis), or self-selection into different 
majors (self-selection hypothesis). 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some background theory 
and literature review. Section 3 introduces the methodology, and section 4 discusses 
collection and profile of the data. Then, section 5 presents findings on risk preferences 
and section 6 demonstrates findings on rationality tests. Section 7 discusses the effect of 
monetary incentives on my subjects’ choices. Section 8 further extends the study by 
looking at the correlation between risk preferences and rationality, and section 9 analyzes 
whether math/science majors behave differently from humanities majors. Finally, section 
10 concludes.  
 
2. Background Theory and Literature Review 
 Expected Utility Theory (EUT) is a model of rational decision-making where a 
decision maker seeks to maximize her welfare in her self-interest, after evaluating each 
choice’s possible outcomes and the outcomes’ probabilities of occurrence. Each outcome 
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is assigned an ordinal value, called utility, that measures the decision-maker’s well-being 
if that outcome is obtained. Then expected utility of the choice is∑i iiup , where ui is the 
utility of the ith outcome, and pi is the probability that the ith outcome will become true. 
An individual is said to be rational if she chooses the option that gives the highest 
expected utility. EUT, thus, provides a framework where a rational being’s choice under 
risk can be determined.  
Also, Von Neumann and Morgenstern stipulated a list of mathematical axioms 
that a rational individual’s preferences must satisfy. It is assumed that a rational person’s 
preferences should be complete (either A is preferred to B or the reverse or they are 
equally desirable), transitive (if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A is 
preferred to C), reflexive (A is at least as good as itself), and invariant (preferences 
between A and B is unaffected by the manner in which these two options are presented).  
Von Neumann-Morgenstern EUT further assumes individuals to be risk averse. 
This is to assume that people tend to choose safer options with lower expected gains over 
riskier options with higher expected gains. The reason for this risk aversion is  
diminishing marginal utility of wealth, and manifests itself in a concave utility function. 
Risk aversion can be approximated by the relative size of expected gains given up for a 
certain prospect. Risk aversion has been found to fall with income and wealth (Hartog et 
al, 2000). Women are also shown to be more risk averse than men (Hartog et al, 2000). 
 However, EUT has frequently been attacked as an unrealistic model of human 
decision-making. It over-emphasizes the choices themselves, but fails to model the 
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motivations, preferences and perceptions in the processes of decision-making (Anslie, 
1982). Also, EUT assumes that people have full knowledge of the available choices, and 
can accurately make calculations to determine which choice gives the best expected 
utility. However, there are limits to which information is available and complex 
calculations can be done. These limits, termed “bounded rationality” by Herbert Simon 
(1957), are what prevent people from always making the best decisions. Therefore, it is 
not too surprising that ample empirical evidence shows that people often deviate from 
what EUT expects them to do (Allais, 1953; McFadden, 1999).  
 In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky proposed the Prospect Theory (PT) as an 
alternative model for decision-making under risk. PT is based on empirical results, and it 
draws on psychology and focuses on the decision-making process. Kahneman and 
Tversky found that individuals make decisions by looking at whether they gain or lose 
from their current states, which are set as neutral reference points, instead of their final 
state of wealth as assumed by EUT. They also found the following important violations 
of rational choice theory in actual human decision-making.   
Certainty Effect:  Changes in people’s utilities are not linear to changes in outcome 
probabilities. People usually overweigh certain options. For example, Kahneman and 
Tversky found that the utility gained when the probability of winning something changes 
from 0.99 to 1 was greater than the utility gained when the probability changes from 0.33 
to 0.34. 
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Reflection Effect: People frequently switch from being risk averse in the positive domain 
of gains to being risk seeking in the negative domain of losses, relative to their neutral 
reference points. Kahnemand and Tversky commented that, “the preference between 
negative prospects is the mirror image of the preference between positive prospects. 
Thus, the reflection of prospects around 0 reverses the preference order” (1979).  
Lottery Effect: People also switch from being risk averse to risk seeking when they face 
extremely low probabilities of winning large payoffs. 
Loss Aversion: A potential loss looms larger than a potential gain of the same size. This 
asymmetry in attitude is too large to be explained by income effects alone. As a results, 
people exhibit “endowment effect”, where they value a good more once it rightfully 
belongs to them, because the pain of losing it far outweighs the benefit of obtaining 
another similarly priced good.  
Framing Effect: Framing of choices sometimes influences people’s decisions. People 
separate a pair of prospects into common and distinctive components, and tend to ignore 
the common component and over-emphasize the differences.  
 Therefore, the utility of wealth function in PT is concave for gains (risk averse) 
and convex for losses (risk seeking), with the function for losses being steeper than that 
for gains (loss aversion). An example of utility of wealth function is shown below in 










Figure 1. an example of the value function in Prospect Theory 
 
 PT provides much insight into how people may deviate from the predictions of a 
rational choice theory such as EUT, and make choices that do not maximize their well-
being. However, PT does not quantify the extent of this irrationality for different groups 
of people, nor does it discuss any factor that may have led to different levels of 
irrationality. On the other hand, as some literature suggests, if an economic activity is 
carried out by a specialist who is repeatedly exposed to the task, the performance may be 
much better modeled by classical rational choice theory (Rabin, 1998). A study by John 
List (2004) examines how experience affects consumers in the marketplace. He ran field 
experiments in natural marketplace and observed whether people displayed the 
endowment effect predicted by PT. He concluded that “prospect theory adequately 
organizes behavior among inexperienced consumers, whereas consumers with intense 
market experience behave largely in accordance with neoclassical predictions”. This 
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study shows that expertise does improve rationality. Thus, it remains a question whether 
academic experience in economics has a similar effect.  
 A number of studies have shown that economics majors adhere more closely to 
the rational and self-interested outlook of traditional economic theories. In a study by 
Marwell and Ames (1981), economics graduate students are found to be much more 
likely to free-ride than any other students. Carter and Irons (1991) also found economics 
students are more selfish when playing ultimatum bargaining games, and this selfishness 
is mainly because of self-selection rather than learning. In another study by Bauman and 
Rose (2009), economics majors were again found to be more selfish in making donations 
to social programs. Again, “this lack of generosity is due to selection, not indoctrination”, 
although indoctrination was found to be effective in reducing donations among non-
economics majors.  
 The author conducted a preliminary study of this topic (Zhou, 2009). A survey 
was administered to junior and senior economics and non-economics majors in 
Occidental College. The survey consisted of pairs of gambling choices to detect the 
subjects’ risk preferences and their responses when induced to display certainty and 
reflection effect under the prediction of PT. It was found that economics majors were 
significantly less risk averse, and were more likely to follow EUT, while non-economics 
majors were more likely to follow PT. Academic experience in economics significantly 
reduced risk aversion and irrationality among non-economics students, but this learning 
effect was not significant among economics majors. This could be because economics 
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majors self-selected into studying economics, or because returns to economics training 
were diminishing.  
 In the past research that explored subjects’ risk preferences and rationality, some 
provided the subjects with monetary incentives in the experiments, while others did not. 
Camerer (1989) and Battalio et al. (1990) found that inclusion of monetary incentives 
induces slightly higher risk aversion. Kachelmeier & Shehata (1992) further discovered 
that subjects were more risk-averse when the monetary incentives were large. Moreover, 
Harrison (1994) reported that actually playing the gambles significantly reduced 
irrationality as opposed to putting forward purely hypothetical choices, while Camerer 
(1989) and Battalio et al. (1990) found no such effect on rationality. As Kagel & Roth 
(1995) summarized, “paid subjects probably do exert extra mental effort, which improves 
their performance, but choice over money gambles is not likely to be a domain in which 
effort will improve adherence to rational axioms. Subjects with well-formed preferences 
are likely to express them truthfully, whether they are paid or not” (pp. 635).  
 
3. Methodology  
 This study is an extension of the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The 
survey used in this study is inspired, modified and extended from the original survey 
designed by Kahneman and Tversky that enabled them to formulate PT. My survey 
attempts to detect each subject’s degree of risk aversion, and whether he or she displays 
certainty effect, framing effect, reflection effect and lottery effect. Overall, this study 
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differs most significantly from that of Kahneman and Tversky in that it differentiates 
subjects according to their economic training. In Kahneman and Tversky’s work, there 
was no background information on the academic composition of their participants, but in 
this study, subjects’ major (actual or intended primary major) and number of economics 
classes completed were recorded. They were further asked whether they have taken 
ECON101: Principles of Economics I, ECON102: Principles of Economics II or 
ECON250: Intermediate Microeconomic Theory. These classes introduce and teach the 
microeconomic theory related to tradeoffs and EUT. In this study, risk preferences and 
irrationality can be compared between economics and non-economics majors, and across 
different levels of economics expertise.  
 This study further extends Zhou (2009) in its attempt to separate self-selection 
and learning effects. Specifically, I ran two kinds of regression:  
Dependent Variable = α0 + α1 ECON +{demographic controls}+ ε 
Dependent Variable = β0 + β1 ECON + β2 CLASSES + β3 ECON*CLASSES + 
{demographic controls}+ ε
 
In the first regression, α1 demonstrates the behavioral difference between economics and 
non-economics majors. This behavioral difference is either due to learning or self-
selection. The second regression differentiates between two effects. Holding 
demographic controls constant, β1 represents the self-selection effect. Theoretically, β1 is 
the impact of being an economics majors when CLASSES = 0. β2 is the learning effect 
among non-economics majors (ECON = 0).  β2 + β3 shows the learning effect among 
economics majors. 
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 One-sided Wald tests are used to test the significance of sums of variables. The 
results of this method of analysis is shown in the result sections of this paper. 
Demographic controls include gender, GPA (self-reported), age, class year and race. Age 
and class year accounts for any maturity effect.  
 It is worth noting that non-economics majors who choose to take economics 
classes may be quite different from those who avoid economics classes. Therefore, some 
of the learning effect among non-economics majors may be partially because of self-
selection. Also, it is possible for freshmen and sophomores to switch majors. Some of 
those who now intend to major in economics may not relate to the “economic way of 
thinking” and later decide to switch to other majors, or some non-economics majors who 
later become interested in economics after taking some classes and switch to be 
economics majors. As a result, learning effects in this study may be biased upward, 
because self-selection effect may not be fully realized for some freshmen and 
sophomores.  
 In this study, monetary incentive was provided; actual gambles were run after 
each subject completed the survey. This monetary incentive helped to elicit subjects’ true 
risk preferences and rationality levels. Thus, this study can be compared with the 
preliminary study where no such incentive was offered, to see whether the introduction of 
monetary incentive reduces irrationality or increases risk aversion. 
 I hypothesize noticeable differences in both risk preferences and degrees of 
irrationality between economics and non-economics majors. Specifically, economics 
majors are more risk neutral and rational, while non-economics majors are more risk 
averse and irrational. Also, similar to my preliminary study, economic training should 
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reduce risk aversion and irrationality among non-economics majors, while this learning 
effect is not necessarily evident among the economics majors. I suspect there is 
significant self-selection among economics students, consistent with the findings of 
Carter and Irons (1991) and Bauman and Rose (2009). 
Other demographic factors may play a role, too. For example, I hypothesize 
female subjects to be more risk-averse and irrational than male subjects, in line with the 
finding by Hartog et al. I also think that subjects with higher GPAs should be more 
rational than those with lower GPAs; subjects with higher GPAs may be more open to 
risk and more capable of making optimal choices under risk, which are two 
characteristics that may have helped them in test-taking. Age may also positively affect 
risk aversion and rationality. However, given paramount evidence on irrational behaviors, 
it is not too surprising if subjects from both groups show significant irrationality. 
 
4. Data and Procedure 
 A total of 114 subjects took the surveys, out of which 108 were valid and 
complete. All participants were students in Occidental College. Upon further 
categorization, there were 30 TE subjects, 21 IEs, 34 TNs  and 23 INs. In this study, all 
data were self-reported. For non-economics majors, I deliberately chose subjects from a 
wide range of majors, spanning from humanities, arts, math, sciences to non-economics 
social sciences. Table 1 provides a statistical description of the demographics of the 
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subjects. The mean statistics of each demographic category is stated, and the standard 




TE          
(trained 
econ)  
IE            
(inexperienced 
econ)  
TN                 
(trained 
non-econ)  





                  
Gender % male  67 71 44 30 53 
GPA   
3.44               
(0.35) 
3.27                           
(0.29) 
3.41                         
(0.34) 
3.60                          
(0.29) 
3.43                       
(0.34) 
Age   
20.8                         
(1.0) 
18.8                     
(0.8) 
19.9                    
(1.5) 
19.7                           
(1.5) 
19.9                
(1.4) 
Year % Freshmen 0 67 24 35 28 
  
% Sophomore 23 33 32 17 27 
  
% Junior 27 0 26 31 21 
  
% Senior 50 0 18 17 24 
Race  % White 73 81 44 70 65 
  
% Asian 27 5 29 22 22 
  
% Other 0 14 27 8 13 
# Econ Classes 
7.5                       
(3.4) 
0.9                            
(0.3) 
1.4                              
(1.1) 0 
2.7                          
(3.5) 
% Taken ECON101 100 90 100 0 77 
% Taken ECON102 100 0 18 0 33 
% Taken ECON250 77 0 6 0 23 
Sample Size  30 21 34 23 108 
 
Table 1. summary statistics of data 
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It is worth noting that TE subjects were predominantly upper-classmen, while IEs 
were all freshmen and sophomores. Non-economics majors were more evenly spread out 
across all class years. Expectedly, TE subjects have completed, on average, much more 
economics classes than TNs, while IEs and INs were the most inexperienced in 
economics training. The sample mainly consisted of white and Asian subjects.  
 The survey was administered online from February 15th to 28th, 2010. A target 
pool of students was selected from the Occidental College Student Directory according to  
major and class year; a subset of these students were randomly chosen to be my subjects. 
They were then emailed about the survey; approximately half of them completed the 
survey. The subjects were informed about the intent of the study, and that they should 
respond according to their personal preferences. They were further told that after 
completing the survey, the author would take the gambles of their choice using a 
mathematical program, MATLAB, and they would win 0.1% of the winnings. The 
average winning was $4 if all the subjects were risk neutral and made optimal choices in 
each survey question. The actual winning for each subject depended on her actual choices 
and luck. The survey consisted of 20 questions, including 8 pairs of gamble or lottery 
choices and 10 questions on demographic information (see Appendix 1 for the print-out 
of the online survey).  
 As promised, after data collection, the author took the gambles for each of the 
subjects and rewarded them accordingly. The random integer generator in MATLAB was 
used to ensure fairness of gamble outcomes. The actual winning ranged from -$6 to $10, 
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but subjects with negative winnings were not charged. The total payout was $430 for 114 
subjects ($3.77 per subject on average). The money were put in the subjects’ mailboxes 
anonymously. 
 
5. Results on Risk Aversion 
The survey questions that examine risk preferences are problem 3 to 5. The 
problems and their results are shown below:  
 
Problem 3: For each option, the first number is the prize of the gamble, and the second 
number is the probability of winning that prize. Therefore, ($3000, 80%) means an 80% 
chance of winning $3000, and a 20% chance of winning nothing.  
Choose between the following two gambles:  
                               A: ($3000, 2/3)                               B: ($2000, 100%) 
                    Expected Value (EV) = $2000                         EV = $2000  
 
Problem 4: Choose between: 
                             A: ($3000, 80%)                               B: ($2000, 100%) 
                                  EV = $2400                                      EV = $2000  
 
Problem 5: Choose between: 
                             A: ($3000, 90%)                               B: ($2000, 100%) 
                                  EV = $2700                                      EV = $2000  
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 These three questions attempt to detect a subject’s risk preference in stages. 
Problem 3 tests whether a subject is risk averse or risk seeking. If an individual prefers A 
in Problem 3, she is risk seeking; if she prefers B, she is risk averse. Problem 4 and 5 tries 
to quantify how risk-averse a subjects is. Choosing B in Problem 4 means that one would 
at least sacrifice $400 out of a risky $2400 for a sure $2000. The level of risk aversion 
can approximated by the relative size of expected gains given up for a certain prospect, so 
in this case, risk aversion is at least at $400/$2400, or 17%.  Similarly, for Problem 5, 
choosing B means a willingness to sacrifice at least $700 out of $2700 for a sure $2000, 
so the level of risk aversion is at least 26% ($700/$2700 ≈ 26%). 
Putting these three problems together, subjects can be categorized into four levels  
of risk aversion (see Table 2): 
 
 Level 1 (Not 
Risk Averse) 
Level 2 (Low 
Risk Aversion) 
Level 3 (Medium 
Risk Aversion) 




A (took a chance) B (stayed safe) B (stayed safe) B (stayed safe) 
Answer to 
#4 
A (took a chance) A (took a chance) B (stayed safe) B (stayed safe) 
Answer to 
#5 
A (took a chance) A (took a chance) A (took a chance) B (stayed safe) 
Risk 
Preferences 
Risk-seeking Risk-averse at a 
level below 17% 
Risk-averse at a 
level between 
17% to 26% 
Risk-averse at 
the level above 
26% 
 
Table 2. categorization of risk preferences 
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 It was possible to categorize all subjects this way, except for 2 subjects who did 
not have consistent risk preferences; both of them took a chance for Problem 3 but stayed 
safe in Problem 4 and switched back to take a chance in Problem 5. We test the 
remaining 106 data in an ordered probit model with an interaction term. The dependent 
variable in this model, RA, is measured according to the previous categorization, with an 
ordinal value of 1 assigned for no risk aversion, 2 for low risk aversion, 3 for medium 















  Risk Aversion Risk Aversion            Risk Aversion           
-0.49** -0.49** ECON 
(0.23) 
-0.73**         
(0.34) 
Econ Behavioral 
Differences  (0.23) 
 -0.36***   CLASSES 
 (0.15) -0.36***  
 0.34** 
Learning among 
Non-Econ (0.15) ECON*CLASSES 
 (0.15)   
0.44** 0.40** -0.02 FEMALE 
(0.23) (0.23) 
Learning among 
Econ (0.051)  
-0.90*** -1.03***   GPA 
(0.34) (0.35) Self-Selection -0.73** 
-0.19 -0.23**  (0.34) AGE 
(0.14) (0.14)   
0.24 0.38   YEAR 
(0.17) (0.20)   
0.41 0.28   WHITE 
(0.35) (0.36)   
0.35 0.34   ASIAN 
(0.39) (0.40)   
 0.059 0.081   
N 106  106   
 
Notes:  
1. The results are presented in the format of coefficient (standard error). 
2. Very similar results were obtained when ordered logit were used instead, showing 
the results are robust (results available upon request) 
3. * significant on a 10% significance level; ** 5%; *** 1%; **** 0.1%. One-tail 
hypothesis tests were performed. 
 




 From these results, we can conclude that economics majors were less risk averse, 
even after controlling for gender, GPA, age, year and race. Also, there was significant 
learning effect among non-economics majors; taking an additional economics class 
reduced risk aversion level by 0.36. However, this learning effect was not evident among 
economics majors; more economics training did not affect economics majors’ risk 
preferences. Self-selection of economics majors was apparent.  
Some demographic controls played a role, too. Higher GPA significantly reduced 
risk aversion, while females had higher risk aversion. Older subjects were also less risk 
averse. Class year and race did not affect risk aversion significantly. These results are 
generally consistent with my hypothesis. 
 
6. Results on Rationality 
6.1. Certainty Effect 
As mentioned before, Kahneman and Tversky found that people display certainty 
effect, where they tend to give a certain option much more weight. This phenomenon is 
manifested in the comparison of results between problem 4 and 10: 
 
Problem 4: Choose between: 
                             A: ($3000, 80%)                               B: ($2000, 100%) 




Problem 10: Choose between: 
                             C: ($3000, 20%)                                D: ($2000, 25%) 
                                  EV = $600                                        EV = $500  
 
If a subject follows EUT, she should choose C if she has chosen A, and should 
choose D if she has chosen B. To see why this is true, without loss of generality, consider 
a subject who is less than 17% risk averse and chose A in problem 4. This means, 
according to EUT, u(3000) * 0.8 > u(2000) * 1, or u(3000)/u(2000) >1.25. Then she 
should choose C in Problem 10 because u(3000)/u(2000) >1.25 means u(3000) * 0.2 > 
u(2000) * 0.25. Thus, Choosing A and D, or B and C are not acting consistently with 
EUT. Especially, choosing B and C reflects the certainty effect in PT. The certain 
prospect of B induces one to choose B over A, while she is really not that risk averse if 
no certain prospect is present.  
Eight subjects chose A and D, and were excluded from the analysis because they 
followed neither EUT nor PT. A binary probit regression, in which the dependent 
variable is equal to 1 when the subject demonstrates the certainty effect, was performed 






  Certainty Effect Certainty Effect            Certainty Effect           
ECON -0.10 
(0.29) 













 (0.24)   






-0.80** -0.94**   GPA 
(0.43) (0.45) Self-Selection -0.25 
-0.09 -0.14  (0.44) AGE 
(0.17) (0.18)   
0.08 0.31   YEAR 
(0.21) (0.25)   
-0.20 -0.50   WHITE 
(0.43) (0.50)   
-0.43 -0.56   ASIAN 
(0.49) (0.55)   
 0.10 0.081   
N 100  100   
 
Note: Again, very similar results were obtained using binary logit (available upon 
request) 
 
Table 4. regression results for certainty effect 
 
As seen from the regression results, we do not have enough evidence to show that 
economics majors were less likely to exhibit certainty effect. Self-selection of economics 
major was also not significant. Among economics majors, holding all demographic 
2R
Zhou 24 
variables constant, learning didn’t reduce certainty effect, but economics training 
significantly reduced display of certainty effect among non-economics majors. Some 
demographic controls had some impacts on certainty effect. Being female increased the 
chance of exhibiting certainty effect, while higher GPA reduced occurrence of certainty 
effect. Age, year and race, again, had minimal impacts.    
 
6.2. Framing Effect 
 As discussed before, Kahneman and Tversky found that people’s choices are 
subject to the framing of choices. Specifically, when people compare pairs of choices, 
they tend to ignore the common components of the choices and over-emphasize on the 
differences. Problem 8 and 10 examine this framing effect. 
 
Problem 8: Consider the following two-stage game.  In the first stage, there is a 75% 
chance to end the game without winning anything and a 25% chance to move to the 
second stage where you then have a choice between: (Your choice must be made before 
the game starts, i.e. before the outcome of the first stage is known) 
   A: ($3000, 80%)                                    B: ($2000, 100%) 
        EV = $600                                               EV = $500 
 
Problem 10: Choose between: 
                 C: ($3000, 20%)                                    D: ($2000, 25%) 
                      EV = $600                                                EV = $500  
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 Problem 8 and 10 are actually identical under EUT. Option A in Problem 8 is a 
75% chance of getting $0 and a 25% chance of getting a 80% chance of $3000, which is 
equal to a 20% chance of getting $3000 (25%*80% = 20%). Similarly, option B in 
Problem 8 is really D in Problem 10, as 25% chance of getting $2000 for sure is 25% 
chance of getting $2000. Therefore, a rational subject should choose either A and C, or B 
and D. If a subject chooses A and D or B and C, she switches her preferences under 
framing influences. Especially, subjects are likely to neglect the first stage in Problem 8 
since it’s common to option A and B.  
Using a similar method of analysis as before, we ran another binary probit 
regression, in which the dependent variable, Framing Effect, is a dummy variable with a 
value of 1 when a subject displays framing effect (choosing B & C or A & D) and 0 when 
the subject makes choices consistent to EUT (choosing A & C or B & D). The regression 










  Framing Effect Framing Effect            Framing Effect           
ECON -0.45* 
(0.28) 













 (0.18)   




-0.43 -0.32   GPA 
(0.42) (0.44) Self-Selection 0.22 
-0.04 -0.07  (0.41) AGE 
(0.17) (0.18)   
0.005 0.25   YEAR 
(0.21) (0.25)   
-0.31 -0.34   WHITE 
(0.41) (0.42)   
0.06 0.23   ASIAN 
(0.47) (0.49)   
 0.14 0.18   
N 108  108   
 
Note: A regression model using a binary logit model with the same variables yields very 
similar results (available upon request). 
 
Table 5. regression results for framing effect 
 
The regression results show that economics majors demonstrated significantly 
less framing effect than non-economics majors, and this was due to learning among 
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economics majors. Self-selection was not evident, and learning was not significant 
among non-economics majors, after controlling for demographic variables. Again, 
females tended to exhibit more framing effect, and subjects with higher GPA displayed 
less framing effect. Age, year and race did not seem to matter in this analysis. 
 
6.3 Reflection Effect 
Kahneman and Tversky found that people exhibits reflection effect, and switch 
from being risk averse in gains to risk seeking in losses. Problem 3 and 7 were designed 
to examine how economics and non-economics majors react to a situation like this. 
 
Problem 3: Choose between the following two gambles: 
                              A: ($3000, 2/3)                               B: ($2000, 100%) 
                                 EV = $2000                                     EV = $2000  
 
Problem 7: Choose between: 
                              C: (-$3000, 2/3)                               D: (-$2000) 
                                 EV = -$2000                                     EV = -$2000 
 
If a subject chose B in problem 3, she is risk averse, but if she switched to the risk 
seeking option of C in problem 7, she is not acting consistently with EUT, but rather, 
following PT’s prediction on reflection effect. The following binary probit model 
analyzes reflection effect in a similar way as before (see Table 6). The dependent 
variable, Reflection Effect, is again a dummy variable equal to 1 when the subject 
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displays reflection effect (choosing B & C or A & D) and 0 when the subject does not 
(choosing A & C or B & D). 
 
  Reflection Effect Reflection Effect            Reflection Effect           
-0.42* -0.42* ECON 
(0.31) 
-0.50              
(0.43) 
Econ Behavioral 
Differences  (0.31) 
 -0.23   CLASSES 
 (0.20) -0.23 
 0.20 
Learning among 
Non-Econ (0.20) ECON*CLASSES 
 (0.20)   
-0.10 -0.13 -0.03 FEMALE 
(0.29) (0.30) 
Learning among 
Econ  (0.07) 
-0.29 -0.29   GPA 
(0.42) (0.42) Self-Selection -0.50 
-0.28* -0.30**  (0.43) AGE 
(0.17) (0.18)   
0.41** 0.51**   YEAR 
(0.22) (0.27)   
0.22 -0.10   WHITE 
(0.43) (0.45)   
0.55 0.49   ASIAN 
(0.51) (0.52)   
 0.06 0.067   
N 108  108   
 
Note: repeating using a binary logit model yields similar results (available upon request). 
 




 It is apparent from the regression results that economics majors displayed less 
reflection effect than non-economics majors, significant at less than 10% level. However, 
it seems that in this case, learning effect was not evident among both economics majors 
and non-economics majors, although learning among non-economics majors significantly 
reduced reflection effect at 12% significance level. Self-selection effect was also 
marginally significant at 12% level. Gender and GPA failed to have significant impacts, 
but age and year seemed to have some impacts.  
 
6.4. Lottery Effect 
              As Kahneman and Tversky found out, people usually switch their risk 
preferences when they face a small probability of winning a large payoff. This study calls 
this phenomenon the lottery effect. Problem 3 and 6 analyze this behavior: 
 
Problem 3: Choose between the following two gambles: 
                              A: ($3000, 2/3)                               B: ($2000, 100%) 
                                 EV = $2000                                     EV = $2000  
 
Problem 6: Choose between: 
                             C: ($6000, 0.1%)                             D: ($6, 100%) 
                                    EV = $6                                        EV = $6 
 
  In this pair of problems, if a subject chooses B in Problem 3, she is risk averse, so 
she should opt for the safer choice in Problem 6, which is D. Similarly, if a subject is risk 
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seeking, she should choose A and C. Switching from B to C or from A to D characterizes 
the lottery effect. The following binary probit regression model analyzes what my 
subjects actually chose (see Table 7). Again, the dependent variable, Lottery Effect, is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 when a subject displays lottery effect (choosing B & C or A & 


















  Lottery Effect Lottery Effect            Lottery Effect           
0.36* 0.36* ECON 
(0.28) 
0.62*            
(0.40) 
Econ Behavioral 
Differences  (0.28) 
 -0.02   CLASSES 
 (0.18) -0.02 
 -0.04 
Learning among 
Non-Econ (0.18) ECON*CLASSES 
 (0.17)   
-0.04 -0.07 -0.06 FEMALE 
(0.27) (0.26) 
Learning among 
Econ  (0.06) 
0.75** 0.81**   GPA 
(0.40) (0.41) Self-Selection 0.62* 
0.05 0.04  (0.40) AGE 
(0.16) (0.16)   
-0.14 -0.03   YEAR 
(0.20) (0.23)   
-0.46 -0.47   WHITE 
(0.40) (0.41)   
0.04 0.09   ASIAN 
(0.45) (0.45)   
 0.04 0.051   
N 108  108   
 
Note: Upon repeating the analysis with a binary logit model, it produces results with 
similar coefficients and significance (available upon request) 
 






 The regression results for lottery effect are very interesting. Economics majors 
behaved differently from non-economics majors, but economics majors tended to display 
significantly more lottery effect. The same pattern showed in the test of self-selection. 
Learning effect, in this case, did not have significant impact among either the economics 
or the non-economics group. 
 This outcome may not be entirely surprising given the design and incentives of 
Problem 7. All other questions in the survey have face-value incentives in the order of 
thousands of dollars, and thus the real incentives are in the order of dollars (award = 0.1% 
of face-value). Problem 7 has an face-value incentive in the order of dollars (EV=$6), and 
thus has a negligible real incentive. Therefore, subjects were more likely to take risks 
when the stake was small; this is consistent with according to the theory of Kachelmeier 
& Shehata (1992). It is likely, as Smith & Walker (1993) suggested, that the monetary 
incentives were not enough to dominate over non-monetary incentives, such as 
excitement of taking the lottery or boredom from not participating in the lottery. 
Although in this case economics majors were less likely to follow EUT, they still acted 
significantly differently from non-economics majors, and this difference in behavior was 
shown to be mainly due to self-selection.  
 Higher GPA increased the exhibition of lottery effect. Other demographic 





 This study attempts to analyze subjects’ rationality by looking at whether they 
would follow PT’s four predictions of irrationality: certainty effect, framing effect, 
reflection effect and lottery effect. The regression results on behavioral differences, 
learning and self-selection effect were not as straight forward as those of risk aversion. 
Table 8 below summarizes the results on rationality. 
 
 Certainty Effect Framing Effect Reflection Effect Lottery Effect 















































Table 8. summary of rationality results 
 
 From this summary, we can see that economics majors did, in most cases, have 
significantly different behaviors from non-economics majors, although there was not 
strong evidence that economics majors behaved more in accordance with EUT. 
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Economics majors were less likely to exhibit reflection effect and framing effect, while 
they actually displayed more lottery effect.  
Each additional economics taken did not seem to change economics majors’ 
behaviors in most situations, but economics training did bring down the occurrences of 
certainty and reflection effect among the non-economics majors. Whenever economics 
majors behaved differently from non-economics majors, this was mostly due to self-
selection of economics majors, so economics majors were mainly born not made. These 
results correspond well with previous studies done by Carter and Irons (1991), Bauman 
and Rose (2009) and Zhou (2009). It seems that economics majors are characteristically 
quite different from non-economics majors in a number of aspects (risk preferences, 
some aspects of rationality, selfishness etc.). This study also echoes Bauman and Rose’s 
and Zhou’s finding where indoctrination (learning) is only effective among the non-
economics majors, but not among the economics majors. 
 
7. Monetary Incentives 
 It is interesting to compare this study with that of Zhou (2009). Both studies have 
similar subject pools and methodologies. One of the most important distinctions is that in 
this study, subjects actually took the gambles of choice and received payments 
proportional to their gamble winnings, but Zhou (2009) did not have any monetary 
incentives. Therefore, it remains a question whether offering performance-related 
monetary incentives changes people’s risk preferences and rationality.  
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 Zhou (2009) only surveyed juniors and seniors at Occidental College, so to make 
the two sets of data comparable, only 49 juniors and seniors in the current 108 subjects 
were considered. Adding 70 data points from Zhou (2009), the pooled data has 119 
subjects, out of which 53 are economics majors and 66 are non-economics majors (see 
Appendix 2 for Zhou 2009’s survey). For risk preferences, Zhou (2009) asked the 
identically phrased Problem 4 and 5 in this study; it did not differentiate between subjects 
with no risk aversion and those with low risk aversion. Therefore, the risk aversion scale 
here is modified to take the value of1 if a subject has low or no risk aversion, 2 for 
medium risk aversion and 3 for high risk aversion. For rationality tests, Zhou (2009) only 
collected data on certainty effect and reflection effect, so only those two rationality tests 
were compared across the two samples. Regression results using ordered probit (risk 
aversion) and binary probit (certainty and reflection effects) are shown below in Table 9. 
Only information on major, number of economics classes taken, gender and GPA was 










on risk aversion 
Monetary incentives 
on certainty effect  
Monetary incentives 
on reflection effect 
  Risk Aversion           
(All + Zhou 2009) 
Certainty Effect           
(All + Zhou 2009) 
Reflection Effect           
(All + Zhou 2009) 
-0.66*** -0.52** -0.10 MONEY 
(0.23) (0.26) (0.37) 
-0.74* 0.003 -1.44** ECON 
(0.46) (0.52) (0.86) 
0.02 -0.02 0.10 CLASSES 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.11) 
0.77**** 0.95**** 0.38 FEMALE 
(0.24) (0.28) (0.37) 
-0.32 -0.311 -1.46*** GPA 
(0.33) (0.38) (0.57) 
 0.14 0.14 0.17 
N 119 117 73 
 
 
Table 9. effects of monetary incentives 
 
 It is apparent from the above regression results that monetary incentives 
significantly decreased risk aversion and display of certainty effect, while having no 
impact on reflection effect. The mixed results for rationality echo those from past studies, 
but the fact that monetary incentives actually reduced risk aversion in this study 
contradicts previous literature. Perhaps subjects in my study were indifferent between not 
earning any money and earning a very small amount of money. There might be a 
threshold earning for each of my subjects, and only getting beyond that threshold 
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increased her utility. Therefore, the subjects in my study might feel like taking excessive 
risks in the hope of earning beyond their own respective thresholds.  
It also may be because of the different incentives the two sets of subjects faced. In 
Zhou (2009), subjects were given the survey with hypothetical rewards in the scale of 
thousands of dollars. It is possible that these subjects pictured themselves deciding 
between thousands of dollars for each question. In this study, however, subjects were 
explicitly told before the start of survey that they would get 0.1% of the specified 
rewards, which were in the order of thousands, so they might have calculated their real 
stakes and were deciding between options with several dollars of value. Thus, it is not 
surprising that subjects in this study were more risk taking because they were facing 
smaller stakes (Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992).  
 Confirming my results in the previous section, economics majors behaved 
significantly differently in risk aversion and reflection effect. Female also had higher risk 
aversion and greater likelihood to display certainty effect.  
 
8. Risk Preferences and Irrationality 
 In this section, we will see whether a person’s risk preference and irrationality are 
correlated. To find out, a series of binary probit regression tests were performed to assess  
the impact of  risk aversion (ordinal rank from 1 to 4 as defined in section 5) on whether 
a subject displays certainty, framing, reflection and lottery effect (see Table 10). ECON, 
CLASSES and all other demographic variables are included as controls.  
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Certainty Effect                                  
 











0.05 0.61** ECON 1.03**                
(0.48)  
0.18 
(0.38) (0.38) (0.36) 
-0.13* -0.16** -0.02 -0.07 CLASSES 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
0.36 0.79*** -0.24 -0.07 FEMALE 
(0.38) (0.29) (0.30) (0.28) 
0.04 -0.16 0.51 0.73** GPA 
(0.53) (0.45) (0.42) (0.41) 
-0.13 -0.08 -0.18 0.03 AGE 
(0.29) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) 
0.47 0.27 0.24 0.007 YEAR 
(0.37) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24) 
0.14 -0.28 0.55 -0.54 WHITE 
(0.58) (0.43) (0.43) (0.41) 
-0.67 0.36 0.82* 0.01 ASIAN 
(0.67) (0.50) (0.50) (0.46) 
 0.43 0.20 0.08 0.06 




Table 10. risk preferences and irrationality 
  
We can see from the above results that higher risk aversion level is correlated 
with higher irrationality, as measured by certainty, framing and reflection effect. The role 
of risk aversion is not significant in the case of lottery effect. Therefore, in most of the 
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cases, a more risk averse subject is more likely to follow PT’s irrationality prediction, 
while a less risk averse subject is more rational and follow EUT.  
 
9. Math and Science Majors 
 During the data collection process in this study and in Zhou (2009), the author 
observed that math or science majors made choices that were quite different from those 
of humanities majors. To test this hypothesis, four regressions were performed among 
non-economics majors (Table 11). Math, Physics, Chemistry and Biology majors were 
classified as math/science majors. An ordered probit model was used to analyze risk 
aversion, binary probit models were used for certainty, framing and lottery effect. Using 
binary probit model failed for the case of reflection effect, because MATHSCI= 1 
perfectly predicted binary response success (all math/science majors displayed reflection 































-0.08* -0.08 -0.25 0.02 -0.13 CLASSES 
(0.16) (0.20) (0.21) (0.06) (0.19) 
0.65** 0.88** 0.64* -0.11 -0.72** FEMALE 
(0.33) (0.41) (0.41) (0.12) (0.39) 
-1.23*** -0.71 0.16 0.19 0.82* GPA 
(0.50) (0.64) (0.61) (0.18) (0.59) 
-0.40** -0.22 -0.02 -0.06 0.11 AGE 
(0.19) (0.23) (0.26) (0.06) (0.20) 
0.67*** 0.58** 0.52* 0.08 0.16 YEAR 
(0.26) (0.32) (0.37) (0.09) (0.29) 
0.10 -0.02 -0.50 0.26* -0.32 WHITE 
(0.43) (0.57) (0.53) (0.16) (0.51) 
-0.14 -0.56 0.19 0.23 -0.32 ASIAN 
(0.47) (0.63) (0.61) (0.18) (0.57) 
 0.11 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.11 




Table 11. math/science majors 
  
 It follows from the regression results that math/science majors did not have a 
significantly different risk preferences from other non-economics majors. Math/science 
majors displayed less certainty, framing and lottery effect than humanities majors, but 
demonstrated more reflection effect. It is reasonable to conclude that in most case, 
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math/science majors acted more in accordance with EUT. Perhaps math/science majors 
were more likely to approach each question in the survey mathematically, for example 
they would probably calculate and compare the expected values of each option, which is 
what EUT predicts a rational being should do.  
 
10. Conclusions  
 This study confirmed that economics majors as a group were less risk averse and 
acted differently from non-economics majors, although it was not necessarily true that 
economics majors acted more in accordance with EUT while non-economics majors 
behaved more in line with PT. When all demographic variables were held constant, 
academic experience in economics seemed to reduce non-economics majors’ risk 
aversion and irrationality as dictated by PT, but this learning effect was not apparent 
among economics majors. At instances when economics majors behaved significantly 
differently from non-economics majors, self-selection of economics majors dominated 
over learning.  
 Higher GPA and being male were generally found to be correlated with lower risk 
aversion and a lower tendency to follow PT, although these impacts were not observed 
consistently throughout.  
 It was also found that monetary incentives in this study reduced risk aversion, but 
failed to have any impact on rationality. Subjects with higher risk aversion were found to 
be more likely to follow the predictions of PT. Math/science majors did not have 
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different risk preferences from humanities majors, but they mostly acted more 
consistently with EUT than humanities majors.  
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Appendix 2. Zhou (2009) survey 
Survey 
 
Irrationality, Risk Aversion and Academic Experience in Economics 
Zhengyi Zhou ECON495&498 
 
**Return your completed survey to me in person, or put it in my Oxy mailbox, 
#1734** 
 
In the first 5 questions, you will see 5 pairs of gamble choices. For each gamble choice, 
the first number (eg $3000) means the prize of the gamble, and the second number 
(eg 80%) means the probability of winning that prize. Therefore, ($3000, 80%) means 
you have an 80% chance of winning $3000, and a 20% chance of winning nothing. 
 
1. Choose between the following two gambles: 
                  A: ($3000, 80%)                    B: ($2000, 100%) 
2. Choose between the following two gambles: 
                  A: ($6000, 0.1%)                   B: ($3000, 0.2%) 
3. In addition to what you own, you have been given $3000. 
         You are asked to choose between: 
                  A: (-$3000, 80%)                   B: (-$2000) 
4. Choose between the following two gambles: 
                  A: ($3000, 90%)                    B: ($2000, 100%) 
5. Choose between the following two gambles: 
                  A: ($3000, 20%)                    B: ($2000, 25%) 
6. Identify your sex. 
                  A: Male                                  B: Female 
7. What is your current college GPA? 
          A: less than 2.50           B: 2.50 - 2.99             C: 3.00 - 3.49             D: 3.50 - 4.00 
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8. What is your primary major? 
                A: Economics                           B: Non-Economics 
9. How many college-level Economics classes have you completed?      
______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
